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ABSTRACT
This document serves as a brief overview of the “Safe and Reliable
Machine Learning” tutorial given at the 2019 ACM Conference on
Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT* 2019). The talk
slides can be found here: https://bit.ly/2Gfsukp, while a video of
the talk is available here: https://youtu.be/FGLOCkC4KmE, and
a complete list of references for the tutorial here: https://bit.ly/
2GdLPme.
Reference Format:
Suchi Saria and Adarsh Subbaswamy. 2019. Tutorial: Safe and Reliable Ma-
chine Learning. In ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Trans-
parency (FAT* 2019).
1 MOTIVATION AND OUTLINE
Machine Learning driven decision-making systems are starting
to permeate modern society—for example, to decide bank loans,
criminals’ incarceration, clinical decision-making, and the hiring of
new employees. As we march towards a future where these systems
underpin most of society’s decision-making infrastructure, it is
critical for us to understand the principles that will help us engineer
for reliability. In this tutorial, we (1) give an overview of issues
to consider when designing for reliability, (2) draw connections
to concepts of fairness, transparency, and interpretability, and (3)
discuss novel technical approaches for measuring and ensuring
reliability.
2 PRINCIPLES OF RELIABILITY
The field of machine learning, despite its increasing use in high-
stakes and safety-critical applications, fundamentally lacks a frame-
work for reasoning about failures and their potentially catastrophic
effects. This is in contrast to traditional engineering disciplines
which have been forced to consider the safety implications across
a broad set of applications, from building a bridge to managing
a nuclear power plant. Bridging across these applications is the
discipline of reliability engineering (see, e.g., [8]) which seeks to
ensure that a product or system performs as intended (without
failure and within specified performance limits). Drawing on this
notion of reliability, we have pulled out three principles of reliability
engineering that we use to group and guide technical solutions for
addressing and ensuring reliability in machine learning systems:
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(1) Failure Prevention: Prevent or reduce the likelihood of
failures.
(2) Failure Identification & Reliability Monitoring: Iden-
tify failures and their causes when they occur.
(3) Maintenance: Fix or address the failures when they occur.
In what follows we will consider each of the principles of reli-
ability in turn, summarizing key approaches when they exist and
speculating about open problem areas. The focus of this tutorial is
on supervised learning (i.e., classification and regression). For an
overview of issues associated with reinforcement learnings see [1].
3 FAILURE PREVENTION
To prevent failures, ideally we could proactively identify likely
sources of error and develop methods that correct for these in ad-
vance. This requires us to explicitly reason about common sources
of errors and issues. We broadly categorize four sources of failures
and discuss them each: 1) bad or inadequate data, 2) differences
or shifts in environment, 3) model associated errors, and 4) poor
reporting.
3.1 Bad or Inadequate Data
Inadequate data can cause errors related to differential performance.
For example, when a particular class or subpopulation is under-
represented in a dataset, the performance of a classifier on these
subgroups can be very poor even though average or overall accu-
racy is high (e.g., [3]). These errors can be avoided by measuring
performance on subpopulations of interest. If key subpopulations
have not been identified, then one could consider clustering data
to find regions of poor support. Inadequate data can be addressed
by collecting more representative data and through better design
of of the objective function.
On the other hand, bad data refers to cases in which the data
simply do not contain the information necessary to answer the ques-
tion or perform the task of interest. Understanding when machine
learning can be applied is crucial to avoiding model misuse. Some
examples are discussed in the tutorial, such as trying to predict
behavioral traits from facial images.
3.2 Differences or Shifts in Environment
Differences between training and deployment environments can
lead to degraded model performance and failures post-deployment.
As an example, in [19] the authors train a model to diagnose pneu-
monia from chest X-rays at a particular hospital. When evaluated
on that dataset, the model yielded good performance. But when
evaluated at two other hospital networks the performance was
significantly worse, calling into question the generalizability or
external validity of the model.
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The issue is that modelers typically assume that training data
is representative of the target population or environment where
the model will be deployed. Yet commonly there is bias specific to
the training dataset which causes learned models to be unreliable:
they do not generalize beyond the training population and, more
subtly, are not robust to shifts in practice patterns or policy in the
training environment. This bias can arise due to the method of data
collection, frequently due to some form of selection bias. The bias
may also be caused by differences between the policy or population
in the training data and that of the deployment environment. In
some instances, the very deployment of the decision support tool
can change practice and lead to future shifts in policy in the training
environment, which leads to dangerous feedback loops (consider
the example of predictive policing algorithms [9]).
The machine learning community has extensively studied this
problem of dataset shift in which training and test distributions are
different [12]. However, the solutions have primarily been reactive
in that they use (unlabeled) samples from the target distribution in
combination with training data during learning to optimize directly
for the target environment. But, in general, it is not feasible to
access data from all possible test environments at training time
(in fact, the deployment environment may be unspecified or may
exist in the future). Thus, we instead want a predictive model that
generalizes to new, unseen environments. Achieving this requires
a shift in paradigm to proactive approaches [17, 18]: in order to
prevent failures we should learn a model that is explicitly protected
against problematic shifts that are likely to occur.
In this subsection of the tutorial we go through the framework
laid out in [18] for preventing failures due to shifts in environment.
The framework is enticing because it allows model developers to
proactively reason about the possible shifts that could occur in their
application, and then dictates what they need to model in order to
make optimal predictions that are unaffected by the shifts they want
to ignore. An overview is as follows: The framework uses directed
acyclic graphs (DAGs) as a language for representing shifts in the
underlying data generating process (DGP) that could occur between
environments. This language is sufficiently expressive to include
common forms of dataset shift (such as covariate and label shift) as
well as more complex ones including policy shift (which leads to
feedback loops [13]). The graphical representation of a DGP can
be augmented (into a selection diagram [11]) to identify the shifts
we want to guard against. Thus, the graph serves as an invariance
specification that a reliable model needs to satisfy. The algorithm
presented in [18] serves as a preprocessing step that dictates which
pieces of the DGP to model, and subsequently these pieces can be
fit using arbitrarily complex models (e.g., neural networks) and
combined to make predictions that satisfy the invariance require-
ments. For a discussion of other properties of this procedure, see
the tutorial video and the paper [18].
3.3 Model Associated Errors
Broadly, we can think of two main types errors related to modeling
choices:
(1) Faulty (implicit) model assumptions
(2) Fragile models
Faulty model assumptions are often due tomodel misspecification.
For example, a linear model may be inappropriate to use in a com-
plex setting with many interactions (i.e., nonlinearities) between
the features. To reduce or prevent model misspecification bias, we
should make meaningful use of inductive bias in our choice of
learner or alternatively consider nonparametric methods. Another
example of a faulty model assumption is the case of dependent data.
It is common practice to assume that samples have independent
errors, but this assumption does not hold when working with geo-
graphic data or social network data where outcomes are tied. The
lesson here is to be explicit about any assumptions that are made
(which is related to having good reporting practices (Section 3.4)).
The issue withmodel fragility occurs when models are applied to
problemswith high dimensional inputs. Themodel is “fragile” in the
sense that its predictions are very sensitive to small perturbations
of the input. An example of this which has received attention in
recent years is the problem of adversarial examples (e.g., [6]). The
high dimensional inputs are images, and by perturbing the images
with human-imperceptible noise the model prediction can change
to be confidently wrong. This sort of failure is complementary to
dataset shift because despite proactive correction, a model can be
susceptible to small perturbations as a result of its parameterization
(i.e., it is a fitting issue).
Research into adversarial training has produced methods that
have useful properties for ensuring reliability. For example, these
methods consider robust objectives in which the goal is to minimize
the loss achieved by the worst-case adversarial attack. Further,
some training methods produce certificates of robustness (e.g., [16])
which give data-dependent bounds on the worst-case loss. Similarly,
methods for model verification provide a means for making yes/no
statements about individual input-output pairs which let us “stress
test” a model (e.g., [4]).
3.4 Poor Reporting
An important source of error is the mismatch between a model’s
intended purpose and the way it is actually used, which is often a
result of poor reporting practices. As opposed to other high-impact
industries (such as transportation or pharmaceuticals), few stan-
dards exist for reporting and documentation in machine learning.
A number of recent proposals seek to address this by creating tem-
plates for appropriate documentation, including “datasheets for
datasets” [5] and “model cards for model reporting” [10]. These pro-
posals advocate explicitly stating intended use, details of creation,
ethical considerations, and many other relevant factors. We think
a natural extension is to also include reliability criteria in model
reporting, since guarantees are a promise regarding reliable be-
havior that should be documented. For example, statements about
likely shifts in environment that were considered, certificates of
robustness, and model verification would improve reporting prac-
tices. The primary open question regarding reporting is: what are
the relevant aspects that should be required in documentation, and
who should decide and enforce such requirements?
3.5 Relating the Sources of Failures
The various sources of errors and the corresponding proactive meth-
ods for preventing them can be integrated together into a checklist
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How do failure prevention ideas fit together
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(1) Check for reliability w.r.t. shifts
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• Report  
responsibly
(0) Can question be answered using this data? Define specs.
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Figure 1: Diagram showing how the various sources of er-
rors relate to reliability.
for ensuring reliability and failure-proofing the development pro-
cess, as shown in Fig 1. We should first ask: can the question of
interest be answered using the available data? Then, we determine
reliability with respect to shifts, check for safety regarding adversar-
ial examples, and we can check for model misspecification. Finally,
we should make sure we have responsibly documented the model
and training procedure. As discussed in the tutorial, there are open
problems related to each source of failure, and addressing them will
be critical for the success of reliable machine learning.
4 FAILURE IDENTIFICATION AND
RELIABILITY MONITORING
Failure prevention takes place prior to and during model learning
and development. Once the system has been deployed we require
a means for test-time monitoring. A useful approach is to assess
point-wise reliability: assess the model output for each new input,
rejecting the output when it is deemed unreliable. This is closely
related to the concept of detecting “out-of-distribution” examples:
samples generated by a process that is different than the process
generating the “nominal” data. These examples are, in some sense,
“far away” from the known data distribution. Extensive literature
for this exists under the names anomaly detection and open-category
detection (see full reference link for more information).
In this section of the tutorial we consider how to compute
point-wise “trust score” to audit a model’s prediction to determine
whether or not to reject the prediction [7, 14]. We primarily con-
sider two criteria for performing the audit: the density principle and
the local fit principle. The density principle essentially asks if the
test case is close to training samples, while the local fit principle
asks if the model was accurate on training samples close to the
test case. By synthesizing these two it is possible to audit model
predictions subsequent to model training (see [14] for details).
While this section is primarily focused on purely algorithmic ap-
proaches to test-time monitoring, it is worth mentioning that there
has been work on human-driven monitoring. These approaches
include crowdsourcing and human-in-the-loop debugging, and are
particularly useful because they are often effective at identifying
a model’s “unknown unknowns” (predictions for which a model
is confident despite being wrong) [2]. For some sample references
consult the relevant section of the tutorial slides.
5 MAINTENANCE
Model maintenance remains a largely open area for ensuring relia-
bility. For example, beyond error monitoring is the question of how
to detect when updates to the model are necessary. Further, how do
we safely update the model? There may be issues of forgetting what
was previously learned or feedback loops created during continuous
learning. The challenges of maintenance are also compounded by
the fact that AI systems are complex with multiple components. See
[15] for a lucid discussion of the maintenance costs associated with
the “technical debt” incurred by machine learning development.
6 CONCLUSION
In this tutorial we have defined reliability as a vital property of a
successful machine learning system: given a specification of de-
sired behavior, we want to ensure that the machine learning system
behaves consistently as intended and is not error prone. We note
that there is some existing work in this direction under the name
“robust machine learning.” However, we believe that robustness,
while an important aspect of reliability (e.g., in guarding against
adversarial examples), is too narrow in scope (in part due to its
connotations with the well-established field of robust statistics)
and fails to address important sources of failure such as model
misuse due to poor reporting. We also note that reliability is sepa-
rate from other desirable properties such as privacy, fairness, and
transparency. We identified three principles for ensuring reliability:
failure prevention, failure identification and reliability monitoring,
and maintenance. It is our hope that these principles will guide
future work and discussions about successfully deploying machine
learning across a variety of domains.
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